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LEGISLATIVE OPPRESSION: RESTRICTING 
GESTATIONAL SURROGACY TO MARRIED COUPLES IS 
AN ATTEMPT TO LEGISLATE MORALITY 
Linda S. Anderson· 
ABSTRACT 
Since the days of Baby M, surrogacy arrangements have become a 
well-accepted form of assisted reproduction. As one of the first 
alternatives available to those who could not create families naturally, 
surrogacy arrangements have been scrutinized and discussed from a 
variety of angles. Today, state laws determine whether surrogacy is 
allowed, establish the standards for the agreements and qualifications 
of those who use this form of family creation, and set limits on 
payments involved in such arrangements. Many states that regulate 
surrogacy through legislation have restricted the availability of 
surrogacy arrangements to married couples, thereby eliminating any 
non-traditional heterosexual couples, single individuals, and in most 
states, all same-sex couples. 
At first glance, this distinction does not seem to violate 
constitutional principles because it does not single out a suspect class, 
nor does it appear to treat similarly situated people differently. 
However, by reviewing a statutory scheme in Florida, where married 
couples have two statutory options for surrogacy arrangements and 
anyone else is limited to only one more burdensome option, it 
becomes clear that the only possible reason for the different treatment 
is the marital status of the intended parent or parents. This article 
suggests that the distinction is based on an effort to legislate a 
particular moral stance about marriage and families, explores whether 
legislation based on morality alone is appropriate, and concludes that, 
when morality is the only reason for a distinction, such legislation is 
not appropriate. Consequently, the requirement that intended parents 
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be married in order to avail themselves of the benefits of gestational 
surrogacy arrangements is an inappropriate attempt to legislate 
morality, and the requirement should be eliminated. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Steve and Marci, a married couple, tried for several years to start a 
family with no success. They engaged the services of a fertility 
specialist yet were still unable to conceive a child. Mitch and Laura, 
a committed couple who had decided to forgo the traditional legal 
trappings of marriage, were in a similar situation, unable to conceive 
despite numerous alternative treatments. Glenn and Jim, a committed 
gay couple, also wanted to start a family, yet wanted to be sure that at 
least one of them was genetically connected to the child they would 
raise together. Though each couple had some options available to 
them, they all did not have the same options. While all could adopt, 
and the two heterosexual couples could use a variety of assisted 
reproductive techniques to attempt to conceive a child of their own, 
in many states only Steve and Marci, the heterosexual married 
couple, had the option to engage the services of a surrogate carrier to 
help them have a child. 1 
In many states, only married heterosexual couples have the option 
of becoming the intended parents of a child born in conjunction with 
a surrogacy contract.2 This article will focus on the effect of 
legislators' concerns about the marital status and sexual orientation of 
the intended parents, and how that concern affects legislation related 
to one particular form of assisted reproduction-the use of a 
gestational surrogate to carry a child. Beginning in Part II, this article 
will briefly introduce the history and evolution of legislation related 
to surrogate arrangements, concluding the description of legislation 
in Part III with an explanation of the current legislative schemes that 
address surrogacy. Using Florida as its basis, Part IV addresses the 
way legislation in this area discriminates against non-married couples 
and individuals. After evaluating the various justifications for the 
discrimination in Part IV, Part V explores the only remaining 
potential justification, morality. Part VI explores the judicial 
response to morals-based legislation and posits that legislation based 
solely on morality expresses animus toward particular groups who do 
not conform to that sense of morality. Part VII concludes that the 
I. See JUDITH DAAR, REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 40 (2006); Darra L. 
Hofman, "Mama's Baby, Daddy's Maybe: " A State-by-State Survey of Surrogacy 
Laws and Their Disparate Gender Impact, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 449, 454-60 
(2009); John A. Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive 
Technology, 55 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 323, 336 (2004). 
2. Hofman, supra note I, at 454-60. 
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only way to avoid the unconstitutional use of morality-based 
justification that discriminates against single individuals and 
unmarried couples is to allow all potential parents to make use of all 
options regarding surrogacy arrangements. 
Though the prominent cases involving surrogacy arrangements, 
especially in the media, have involved intended parents who are 
married, the use of surrogacy agreements is one of the few options 
available to those who are in same-sex relationships or to those who 
do not have an opposite-sex partner.3 Almost all states that allow 
surrogacy agreements restrict them to married couples or make the 
process significantly more burdensome for unmarried intended 
parents.4 At the time the legislation was first introduced, imposing an 
additional burden on those who were not in a heterosexual marriage 
may have originally been designed to hinder those outside of 
heterosexual marriages from using assisted reproduction techniques 
in an effort to provide the most suitable environment for the resulting 
children.5 However, in today's world, parents come in all sizes, 
shapes, marital statuses, and sexual orientations. There is no 
legitimate reason to continue to differentiate between intended 
parents based on marital status or sexual orientation.6 Continuing to 
do so is simply an effort to retain a hold on a specific moral view of 
the world that is no longer as popularly agreed upon as in the past.7 
Imposing this moral view on everybody demonstrates animosity 
toward those who do not conform.8 This norm is based on an 
outdated idea of morality-; one that is driven by religious views, and 
one that is no longer a valid reason for restricting behaviors or rights 
to access certain services, such as gestational surrogacy.9 
II. SOCIETY'S DEBATE ABOUT SURROGACY 
A. Background 
Despite the innate need to procreate, not everyone is able to do so. 10 
Infertility and its treatment have been documented as early as the 
3. See Robertson, supra note 1, at 359. 
4. See June Carbone, The Role of Adoption in Winning Public Recognition for Adult 
Partnerships, 35 CAP. U. L. REv. 341,380 (2006). 
5. See Hofman, supra note 1, at 460. 
6. Anne R. Dana, Note, The State of Surrogacy Laws: Determining Legal Parentage for 
Gay Fathers, 18 DUKE J. GENDERL. &PoL'Y 353, 374 (2011). 
7. /d. at 373-74. 
8. See id. 
9. See id. at 374. 
10. DAAR, supra note 1, at 10. 
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fifth century B.C., when Hippocrates wrote of various recipes for its 
cure. 11 Reasons for infertility vary. Possible causes of infertility 
range from medical abnormalities in connection with reproductive 
organs; side effects of treatments of other medical conditions, such as 
chemotherapy or radiation treatment for cancer; social conditions; 
and unknown causes. 12 Today, there are a variety of assisted 
reproductive techniques to help infertile individuals have children. 
These include techniques that allow for the introduction of sperm 
through non-coital means, others that combine egg and sperm outside 
the body and then introduce the fertilized egg back into the uterus or 
fallopian tubes, and variations of these procedures that enhance the 
chances of conception, such as intracytoplasmic sperm injection, 
where the sperm is injected directly into the egg outside the body. 13 
In addition, for those who are unable to carry a child regardless of 
how it is conceived, surrogacy provides an option that allows at least 
one of the gamete donors to be genetically connected to the resulting 
child. 14 It is also possible to use a surrogate carrier with donated 
gametes, allowing the intended parents to cause the child to be 
conceived without contributing to the genetic materials used to do 
so. Is 
Until the 1980s, when the infamous Baby M case16 brought 
surrogacy to the nation's attention, most people had not considered 
the complicated consequences of using a non-traditional approach to 
family building. 17 Then came the media frenzy surrounding the Baby 
M case. 18 Discussions about Marybeth Whitehead, the surrogate 
mother who had used her own egg and the sperm of William Steam, a 
married man whose wife was unable to bear children, became 
II. /d. at 25. 
12. See AM. SOC'Y REPROD. MED., INFERTILITY: AN OVERVIEW: A GUIDE FOR PATIENTS, 6, 
8-9, 11, 14 (20 12), available at http://asnn.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM _Content/ 
Resources/Patient_ Resources/Fact_ Sheets_ and _Info_ Booklets/infertility_ overview.pd 
f; U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-BA-358, INFERTILITY: MEDICAL 
AND SOCIAL CHOICES, 61-84, (1988), available at 
http://www.fas.org/ota/reports/8822.pdf. 
13. See DAAR, supra, note I, at 40. 
14. E.g., Dana, supra note 6, at 360. 
15. See Helene S. Shapo, Matters of Life and Death: Inheritance Consequences of 
Reproductive Technologies, 25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1091, 1161 (1997). 
16. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
17. Sarah Mortazavi, Note, It Takes a Village to Make a Child: Creating Guidelines for 
International Surrogacy, 100 GEO. L.J. 2249, 2262 (2012); see also Christine L. 
Kerian, Article, Surrogacy: A Last Resort Alternative for Infertile Women or a 
Commodification of Women's Bodies and Children?, 12 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 113, 116-
17 (1997). 
18. Mortazavi, supra note 17, at 2264. 
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common. 19 All forms of media outlets, newspapers, television news, 
talk shows, and radio shows covered the news of the surrogate 
mother who changed her mind about giving up her baby to the 
biological father and literally "stole" the child and went into hiding 
until she was finally found several months later, at which point the 
child was returned to the Steams.20 Yet even then, the drama was still 
unfolding as people followed the court case that determined who 
would be considered Baby M's parents.21 By the time it was over in 
1988, several state legislatures had already begun to consider how to 
regulate situations where surrogates might be used.22 In states where 
the legislature had not yet acted, courts found that they had to address 
the issue with no guidance.23 
Prior to 1978, when the use of in vitro fertilization became 
possible, the only form of surrogacy available (now referred to as 
traditional surrogacy) required the use of the gestational mother's 
ovum.24 This created a genetic connection between the gestational 
carrier and the resulting child, which allowed courts to comfortably 
identify the surrogate as the legal mother when disputes arose. 25 
Once it became possible to fertilize an egg in the lab and place the 
resulting zygote into a woman's uterus for gestation through in vitro 
19. See id. at 2262-64. 
20. See, e.g., Robert Hanley, Baby M Will Become Angry Over Legal Fight, Mother Says, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1987, at Bl; Roger Rosenblatt, Baby M - Emotions for Sale, 
TIME, Apr. 6, 1987, at 88; United Press lnt'l, Daughter Can't Testify for Surrogate 
Mom in Trial, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 7, 1987, available at 
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1987 -02-07 /news/0 I 00460021_1_ whitehead-baby-
m-surrogate-mother. The story was even made into a TV movie. Baby M (ABC 
Circle Films 1988), http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0094696/. 
21. The final decision regarding custody was issued on February 3, 1988, almost two 
years after Baby M was born, and approximately eighteen months after she was 
returned to Mr. Steams. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, at 1234-35. 
22. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 9:2713 (2005) (originally enacted by Acts 1987 No. 583 § 
I, 1987 La. Sess. Law Serv. 583 (West)); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.851 (West 
2011) (originally enacted by 1988 Pub. L. No. 199, § I, 1988 Mich. Legis. Serv. 199 
(West)); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 127.287 (LexisNexis 2010) (originally enacted by 
1987 Nev. Stat. 2049); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West 2002) (originally enacted by 
1983 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. (West)). 
23. See Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rei. Armstrong, 704 
S.W.2d 209, 213-14 (Ky. 1986); Yates v. Keane, 457 N.W.2d 693 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1990); In reAdoption of Baby Girl L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813,818 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1986); 
In reAdoption of Reams, 557 N.E.2d !59, 162 (Ohio Ct. App. lOth Dist. 1989). 
24. Carla Spivack, The Law of Surrogate Motherhood in the United States, 58 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 97,98 (Supp. 2010). 
25. !d. 
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fertilization, gestational surrogacy became the more popular option.26 
Gestational surrogacy allows the surrogate to avoid any genetic 
connection to the resulting child, which makes it easier for an 
intended couple to be considered the legal parents.27 
States are free to allow or ban surrogacy arrangements, leading to a 
good deal of disparity in the way such arrangements are treated. 28 
When surrogacy first became a reasonable option, issues arose 
regarding the distinction between providing a gestational service and 
selling babies?9 Issues of whether payment for services was 
appropriate,30 enforceability of contracts,31 and resolution of disputes 
involving custody and parentage caused some states to ban the 
practice of using surrogate agreements altogether.32 Other states 
limited the compensation involved or included restrictions on the 
terms of agreements.33 The remaining states avoided the topic 
completely, leaving the legality of the agreements in those 
jurisdictions unclear. 34 
Generally, compensation of surrogates is discouraged.35 By 
restricting payment to identifiable costs of the process and resulting 
pregnancy, concerns about baby selling and exploitation of women 
are avoided.36 The issues of enforceability of contracts and parentage 
determinations, though still not settled completely, have been well 
debated and generally addressed either through legislation or court 
decisions. 37 Though different from state to state, the individual 
jurisdictional approach to basic surrogacy issues has become rather 
apparent and settled by the jurisdictions that have addressed the 
issues.38 
26. See id. at 98-99. 
27. See id. 
28. See id. at 101. 
29. Cf Andrea B. Carroll, Reregulating the Baby Market: A Call for a Ban on Payment of 
Birth-Mother Living Expenses, 59 U. KAN. L. REv. 285, 290-94 (2011). 
30. Cf id. at 293-94. 
31. Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 VA. 
L. REv. 2305, 2307-08 (1995). See generally Richard A. Posner, The Ethics and 
Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH 
L. & POL 'y 21 (1989). 
32. See Spivack, supra note 24, at 101. 
33. See Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the 
Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REv. 835, 851 (2000). 
34. Spivack, supra note 24, at 102. 
35. See id. at 10 l. 
36. See Carroll, supra note 29, at 310, 313. 
37. See Spivack, supra note 24, at 101-11. 
38. See id. at 101-02. 
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Now that the use of surrogacy agreements has become an accepted 
option for dealing with infertility problems, new, secondary issues 
have begun to arise as more parties attempt to fit this service into 
their own personal situations. The use of gestational surrogates has 
opened doors for parties to add contract provisions for certain 
situations that allow a more personalized determination of the legal 
and social status of all involved.39 Though a gestational surrogate is 
not generally recognized as a legal parent, some contracts establish 
the nature of the connection between the gestational surrogate, the 
resulting child, and the intended parents.40 These agreements often 
involve sharing information about the child with the gestational 
mother and may involve establishing some sort of visitation, making 
the gestational surrogate a quasi-parent or at least a quasi-relative 
who has some involvement with the resulting child.41 
Some gestational surrogates provide this service several times, and 
in addition to the altruistic reasons for doing so, in states where some 
compensation is allowed, the gestational surrogate is potentially 
39. See Sample Gestational Surrogacy Agreement, ALL ABOUT SURROGACY.COM, 
http:/ /www.allaboutsurrogacy.com/sample _ contracts/TScontract2.htm (last visited 
June 31 ,2013). 
40. See id. 
41. An example of such contract provisions can be found in a sample contract provided by 
AIIAboutSurrogacy.com. !d. The relevant language is: 
!d. 
11. Postpartum contact between the Genetic Father, resulting 
offspring and Surrogate shall be upon the mutual agreement of the 
parties with the best interest of the Child controlling it. 
11.1. Without it consisting any alienation of Genetic Father' 
rights as to the sole and exclusive custody, parental responsibility, 
decision-making, care and control of the Child nor setting up base 
for any claim from Surrogate to this effect, it is Genetic Father 
intention to allow Surrogate to visit the Child freely, after having 
previously set an appointment for such visit. All the visits shall be 
in the presence of the Genetic Father unless permitted otherwise 
by the Genetic Father. 
11.2. Under no consideration will the Surrogate take the Child 
from the custody of the Genetic Father or leave with the Child to 
take him to a place different than the one where she was permitted 
to visit him. Such visits shall not be construed as shared custody 
visitation rights nor set base for any claim to such. At any time, 
with consideration to the Child's well being and best interest, 
Genetic Father may change or end the regimen of such visits. 
11.3. Surrogate, agrees that in the best interest of the child she 
will not form or attempt to form a parent-child relationship with 
any child born pursuant to the terms of this Agreement. 
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engaging in a business endeavor.42 Like any other service-related 
business, it seems reasonable for there to be incentives and 
consequences involved in the provision of this service. However, 
these issues have not yet been addressed through legislation or 
appellate court decisions. 
Another secondary issue arises when parties to the surrogacy 
agreement are located or have obtained services in different 
jurisdictions. Typical conflict-of-laws analysis is usually sufficient to 
address concerns with various states, but many people use surrogates 
from other countries as well.43 For instance, India has a number of 
surrogacy agencies that provide gestational surrogates for American 
or European intended parents.44 Recently, issues related to the 
citizenship of the resulting child have caused unanticipated 
complications for people using these services.45 
An additional issue is access to surrogacy agreements by parties 
who are not heterosexual married couples. Most legislation has 
limited surrogacy agreements to married couples, identifying them as 
husband and wife.46 Some, however, have been silent about who can 
use a traditional surrogate, and at least one state, Florida, has separate 
statutes relating to traditional surrogacy and gestational surrogacy, 
with marital status as one of the criteria for which type of 
arrangement is available.47 Anyone can make use of a traditional 
surrogate.48 Only married heterosexual couples get the full benefit of 
the statute related to gestational surrogates.49 As this article will 
demonstrate, there are very important benefits available through the 
gestational surrogacy statute that are not available to those who 
choose, or are restricted to, traditional surrogacy. 5° 
42. See Epstein, supra note 31, at 2318-19. 
43. Clarissa Ward, More Americans Now Traveling to India for Surrogate Pregnancy, 
ABC NEWS (Apr. 27, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/adoption-india-americans-
plan-surrogacy-abroad/story?id= l 0487880. 
44. Isha Bhatia, Indian Surrogacy Industry Sets Take-Home-Baby Trend, DEUTSCHE 
WELLE (June 2, 2013), http://www.dw.de/indian-surrogacy-industry-sets-take-home-
baby-trend/a-16579078. 
45. See, e.g., Marcelo de Alcantara, Surrogacy in Japan: Legal Implications for 
Parentage and Citizenship, 48 FAM. CT. REv. 417 (2010). 
46. Richard F. Storrow, Rescuing Children from the Marriage Movement: The Case 
Against Marital Status Discrimination in Adoption and Assisted Reproduction, 39 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 305, 334 (2006). 
47. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 742.15 (West 2010) (requiring marriage for gestational 
surrogacy), with FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.213 (West Supp. 2013) (identifying parties 
without requiring any of them to be married). 
48. See§ 63.213 (West Supp. 2013). 
49. § 742.15(1) (West 2010). 
50. See infra Part IV. 
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B. Applying Existing Law to Surrogacy Disputes 
Faced with this new technological aspect of reproduction, several 
courts attempted to address issues related to surrogacy arrangements 
by applying existing legislative schemes. When the Kentucky 
Attorney General attempted to revoke the charter of a corporation 
that provided surrogacy services, the Kentucky Supreme Court was 
forced to evaluate whether baby-selling statutes applied to businesses 
providing surrogacy options.51 In Surrogate Parenting Associates, 
Inc. v. Commissioner ex rei. Armstrong,52 the court eventually 
decided that the statutes related to baby selling could not apply 
because the agreements regarding the children occurred before 
conception. 53 The court assumed that the traditional process for 
terminating the mother's rights that was used in adoption proceedings 
would apply, so the mother would have the opportunity to change her 
mind after the birth of the child. 54 This essentially set out the 
guidelines for surrogacy agreements, but the court invited the 
legislature to take action. 55 The Kentucky legislature eventually 
changed the rule announced in Surrogate Parenting when it outlawed 
surrogacy agreements that involved compensation. 56 
The New York Surrogate Court also invited legislative action since 
it wanted to avoid judicially legislating on this issue.57 Faced with 
deciding the fate of a child born to a surrogate who had been paid 
$10,000, and whether the contractual arrangement would be given 
legal effect, the court declined to apply the existing adoption law 
statutes, which prohibited payment in this situation.58 Instead, it 
reluctantly upheld the agreement, including the payment provisions, 
indicating that since the legislature had not contemplated surrogacy 
when it had enacted a ban on payment for adoption of a child, the 
court could not legislate from the bench. 59 
51. Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rei. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 
209, 210-ll (Ky. 1986). 
52. Id. 
53. Jd.at211. 
54. !d. at 212-13. 
55. Id. at 213-14. 
56. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 {West 2006). 
57. See In reAdoption of Baby Girl L.J., 505 N.Y.S.2d 813, 818 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1986) 
("However, the court requests the legislature to review this serious problem in order to 
determine whether statutory provisions should be made to allow or disallow the 
payments requested herein and the practice of surrogate parenting."). 
58. !d. at 814,817-18. 
59. !d. at 817-18. 
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C. Legislative Attempts to Regulate or Restrict Surrogacy 
As states first began to enact legislation, there were four different 
types of statutes considered. Some outlawed compensation to 
surrogates but remained silent regarding voluntary agreements or the 
rights of those involved.60 Others outlawed contracts that involved 
compensation to the surrogate and attempted to address other issues 
for agreements that did not involve compensation.61 A third category 
outlawed surrogacy altogether, regardless of compensation, but still 
went on to address such things as parentage, recognizing that whether 
enforceable or not, there may be agreements that would result in 
children whose status must be addressed.62 Finally, there were 
statutory attempts to exempt surrogacy from existing legislation on 
adoption, but with no additional attempts to regulate the practice.63 
60. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 9:2713 (2005). Section A of this statute states: "A 
contract for surrogate motherhood as defined herein shall be absolutely null and shall 
be void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy." !d. 
61. Compare WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.26.230 (West 2005) (banning surrogacy 
agreements for compensation by stating: "No person, organization, or agency shall 
enter into, induce, arrange, procure, or otherwise assist in the formation of a surrogate 
parentage contract, written or unwritten, for compensation"), with id. § 26.26.260 
(recognizing that surrogacy agreements without compensation would be valid and 
would require parentage determinations: "If a child is born to a surrogate mother 
pursuant to a surrogate parentage contract, and there is a dispute between the parties 
concerning custody of the child ... "). 
62. E.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (2007) (holding unconstitutional in the case 
Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994)). This statute, enacted in 
1989, stated: 
!d. 
A. No person may enter into, induce, arrange, procure or 
otherwise assist in the formation of a surrogate parentage contract. 
B. A surrogate is the legal mother of a child born as a result of a 
surrogate parentage contract and is entitled to custody of that 
child. 
C. If the mother of a child bom as a result of a surrogate contract 
is married, her husband is presumed to be the legal father of the 
child. This presumption is rebuttable. 
D. For the purposes of this section, 'surrogate parentage contract' 
means a contract, agreement or arrangement in which a woman 
agrees to the implantation of an embryo not related to that woman 
or agrees to conceive a child through natural or artificial 
insemination and to voluntarily relinquish her parental rights to 
the child. 
63. E.g., NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 127.287 (LexisNexis 2010). This statute bans payment 
for adoption, but paragraph 5 states: "The provisions of this section do not apply if a 
woman enters into a lawful contract to act as a surrogate, be inseminated and give 
birth to the child of a man who is not her husband." !d. At the time this statute was 
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Louisiana was the first state to enact legislation governing 
surrogacy.64 The Louisiana statute made surrogacy contracts that 
involved compensation void and unenforceable.65 Soon after, 
Washington made agreements involving compensation void and 
unenforceable66 yet recognized that volunteer agreements could be 
used that would require determinations of the rights and obligations 
of the parties involved. 67 The Washington legislature additionally 
mandated that existing laws regarding a child's best interests applied 
to make these determinations. 68 
At least initially, Nevada legislation suggested that surrogacy might 
be viable but exempted it from statutes on adoption. 69 Arizona and 
Michigan each attempted to outlaw surrogacy in any form yet also 
included statutory provisions that established parentage rights and 
custody for children born of such agreements. 70 Apparently, the 
legislatures in these states recognized that they could prevent the 
agreements from being enforceable by the court but might still have 
to deal with the resulting children of agreements that did not involve 
disputes between the contracting parties.71 Finally, of the early 
legislative efforts, Indiana enacted very specific provisions, making 
certain portions of agreements unenforceable but allowing 
agreements that followed guidelines enumerated in the statutes.72 
enacted, there were no provisions for valid surrogacy agreements in Nevada. The 
current statute that regulates such agreements was enacted in 1993. See id. § 126.045. 
64. Dana R. Bennett, Surrogate Parenting, Nev. Legislative Council Bureau, Research 
Div., Background Paper 88-2, available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Division/ 
Research/Publications/Bkground/BP88-02.pdf; see also LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 9:2713 
(2005)) (enacted Sept. I, 1987). 
65. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713A ("A contract for surrogate motherhood as defined 
herein shall be absolutely null and shall be void and unenforceable as contrary to 
public policy."). 
66. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§§ 26.26.230, 240. 
67. See id. (establishing parentage and custody of a child born through surrogacy 
arrangements). 
68. See id. (establishing parentage and custody of a child born through surrogacy 
arrangements). 
69. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 127.287. 
70. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.855, 859, 
861 (West 2011). 
71. See supra notes 63-73 and accompanying text. 
72. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-8-2-1 (LexisNexis 2007), repealed by Pub. L. No. 1-1997, § 
157. The former statute read: 
CHAPTER 2. SURROGATE AGREEMENTS; 
ENFORCEABILITY 
§ 31-8-2-1. Agreements which may not be enforced. 
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D. Model Legislation Efforts 
By 1990, there were two model acts that addressed issues related to 
surrogacy: The Model Surrogacy Act proposed by the American Bar 
Association and the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted 
Conception Act, drafted by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 73 Each of these has evolved 
and been incorporated into more comprehensive versions.74 
Originally, the Model Surrogacy Act eliminated the presumptive 
maternity of the surrogate, ceding that decision to the surrogacy 
contract itself.75 It also authorized a fee for the surrogate and 
addressed issues about informed consent. 76 
The focus of the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted 
Reproduction Act was the status of the resulting child in relation to 
the parents. 77 Broader than the Model Surrogacy Act, the Uniform 
Children of Assisted Reproduction Act addressed relationships 
created by any type of assisted reproduction. 78 Many of the 
requirements included in the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted 
Reproduction Act mirrored those already in place for adoptions, such 
as home studies and a guardian ad litem, to represent the best 
interests of the resulting child or children. 79 
The provisions of these two model acts, along with several other 
model acts that attempted to clarify rights and obligations of parents 
The general assembly declares that it is against public policy to 
enforce any term of a surrogate agreement that requires a 
surrogate to do any of the following: 
(1) Provide a gamete to conceive a child. 
(2) Become pregnant. 
(3) Consent to undergo or undergo an abortion. 
( 4) Undergo medical or psychological treatment or examination. 
(5) Use a substance or engage in activity only in accordance with 
the demands of another person. 
(6) Waive parental rights or duties to a child. 
(7) Terminate care, custody, or control of a child. 
(8) Consent to a stepparent adoption under IC 31-3-1. 
Pub. L. No. 175-1988, § 1. 
73. Linda S. Cioffredi, New Hampshire in Surrogacy: Making Way for the Future, 31 
N.H. B.J. 189, 192-93 (1990). 
74. See, e.g., UNJF. PARENTAGE ACT (2002). 
75. Cioffredi, supra note 73, at 192. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 193; Ann MacLean Massie, Restricting Surrogacy to Married Couples: A 
Constitutional Problem? The Married-Parent Requirement in the Uniform Status of 
Children of Assisted Conception Act, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487,492-93 (1991). 
78. See Cioffredi, supra note 73, at 192-93; Massie, supra note 77, at 489-90. 
79. See Cioffredi, supra note 73, at 193. 
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and children, were consolidated into the Uniform Parentage Act 
(UPA).80 The amended version of the UPA treats children equally 
regardless of their parents' marital status.81 Article 8 addresses 
gestational agreements.82 The drafters recognized that there was no 
consistency among the states about how to handle decisions related to 
gestational surrogacy, so the section was created in a manner that 
allowed states to eliminate this section without compromising the 
provisions of the rest of the UP A. 83 Article 8 requires court approval 
of surrogacy agreements84 and insures that children will be supported 
even if the arrangements do not proceed as contemplated.85 In a 
significant departure from earlier acts, the 2002 amended version 
eliminates the need for one of the intended parents to have a genetic 
connection to the resulting child. 86 
III. SURROGACY LEGISLATION TODAY 
Today, those states that have surrogacy legislation run the gamut 
from criminalizing surrogacy agreements87 to the types of 
comprehensive regulation now part of the Uniform Parentage Act.88 
Legislatures and courts still grapple with three concerns: whether 
there are differences related to traditional surrogacy or gestational 
surrogacy, 89 whether the surrogate gets compensated for more than 
80. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2002). 
81. /d. at prefatory note. 
82. /d. art. 8. 
83. /d. art. 8, intro. cmt. 
84. See id. §§ 801-{)3. 
85. See id. § 807. 
86. /d. art. 8, intro. cmt. 
87. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. L. § 123 (McKinney 2012). 
Any person or entity who or which induces, arranges or otherwise 
assists in the formation of a surrogate parenting contract for a fee, 
compensation or other remuneration or otherwise violates this 
section, after having been once subject to a civil penalty for 
violating this section, shall be guilty of a felony. 
/d. § 123(2)(b ). 
88. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 168:B (LexisNexis 2010). 
89. Traditional surrogacy involved the use of the surrogate mother's egg and the sperm of 
the intended father or a donor. Gestational surrogacy requires that there be no genetic 
connection to the surrogate mother. Hofman, supra note 1, at 451. 
Surrogacy's permutations can include situations where: 
• A surrogate serves solely as the gestational mother to a child 
who is the genetic offspring of both intended parents (often called 
"gestational surrogacy"); 
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the expenses incurred as a result of the pregnancy, and whether the 
intended parents must be married and heterosexual. 90 
Most states restrict surrogacy agreements to married couples.91 In 
doing so, these states' legislatures have not explicitly explained why 
they have made this choice. It is likely that this is a political move-
a way to appease those who believe that only married couples should 
have children and to get support for this alternative means of doing 
so, which may be a stretch for some with strong beliefs about 
reproduction and marriage.92 In fact, the Catholic Church does not 
approve of the use of surrogacy even if the intended parents are 
married.93 Looking at the restriction to married couples as a 
compromise may be an accurate explanation. For example, when the 
Florida legislature enacted the initial legislation that addressed 
surrogacy, the Preplanned Adoption statute,94 two of the sponsors of 
the bill reported on the process in an effort to assist others who might 
be contemplating such a legislative effort.95 The sponsors, both 
physicians as well as legislators, described the process of garnering 
support from various interested groups, such as the Florida Medical 
Association, the Florida Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 
and the Florida Society of Reproductive Endocrinologists.96 Other 
interested organizations that were not involved in the direct provision 
of medical services related to surrogacy included the American Civil 
Liberties Union and the Florida Catholic Conference.97 In the initial 
!d. 
• A surrogate serves as both the genetic and the gestational mother 
to a child who is the genetic offspring of the intended father (often 
called "traditional surrogacy"); .... 
90. !d. at 460. 
91. Jamie L. Zuckerman, Comment, Extreme Makeover-Surrogacy Edition: Reassessing 
the Marriage Requirement in Gestational Surrogacy Contracts and the Right to 
Revoke Consent in Traditional Surrogacy Agreements, 32 NOVA L. REv. 661, 680 
(2008). 
92. Hofman, supra note I, at 460. 
93. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, 631, Part Three, Section Two, Chapter Two, 
Article 6, III, 2376 (1997) {"Techniques that entail the dissociation of husband and 
wife, by the intrusion of a person other than the couple (donation of sperm or ovum, 
surrogate uterus), are gravely immoral. These techniques {heterologous artificial 
insemination and fertilization) infringe the child's right to be born of a father and 
mother known to him and bound to each other by marriage. They betray the spouses' 
'right to become a father and a mother only through each other."'). 
94. FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 63.213 (West Supp. 2013). 
95. See Angeli R. Maun eta!., The Passage of Florida's Statute on Assisted Reproductive 
Technology, 84 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 889, 891 (1994). 
96. See id. at 891. 
97. See id. 
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efforts to avoid strong opposition from the Catholic delegation, the 
drafters and sponsors included many provisions that mirrored the 
adoption process, including the requirement that the intended parents 
be married.98 Some of those requirements were later jettisoned from 
the bill, but even when they were included, they appeased the 
Catholic delegation only to the point of avoiding a strong 
oppositional campaign.99 In the end, that group still refused to 
support the legislation. 100 
Regardless of the reasons for distinguishing between married and 
unmarried couples, those distinctions are common to most legislation 
regarding surrogate agreements. 101 Creating distinctions such as 
these where none should exist is unconstitutional discrimination. The 
Florida statutory scheme provides a vivid example of this type of 
discrimination. 
IV. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST NON-MARRIED COUPLES 
AND INDIVIDUALS 
Most states that have legislation regarding surrogacy restrict all 
forms of surrogacy to married couples. 102 One group clearly 
prohibited from this option is same-sex couples. 103 But unmarried 
heterosexual couples are also prohibited from accessing these 
arrangements. 104 Since the legislation does not single out only same-
sex couples, it is difficult to suggest that the legislation discriminates 
against couples based on their gender. 105 If this were the case, the 
Equal Protection analysis would likely allow for some enhanced level 
of scrutiny to determine whether the discrimination was 
constitutional. 106 But when left with rational basis review, one who 
wishes to challenge these statutes must demonstrate that, in addition 
to same-sex couples, regardless of their marital status, the unmarried 
couples and individuals are similarly situated to the married couples, 
98. See id. at 891-92. 
99. See id. at 892-93. 
100. See id. at 893. 
101. Zuckerman, supra note 91, at 680. 
102. !d. 
103. See supra Part III. 
104. See supra Part III. 
105. FLA. STAT. ANN.§§ 742.13-15 (West 2010); § 63.213 {West Supp. 2013). 
106. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (identifying 
heightened scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review for claims of discrimination 
based on sex). 
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and the distinction between married or unmarried persons has no 
legitimate purpose. 107 
A. An Example of Blatant Discrimination 
By enacting two alternative ways to use a surrogate carrier, Florida 
has provided a clear basis for arguing that unmarried couples and 
individuals, regardless of sexual orientation, are similarly situated to 
married couples when it comes to the use of surrogate parentage 
arrangements. 108 One of the most blatant examples of the distinctly 
different ways intended parents are treated differently based on 
marital status is the statutory scheme in Florida.109 While most 
scholars describe the Florida surrogacy statute as one that is limited 
to married couples, llO Florida actually has two different statutes that 
can apply to a surrogacy agreement depending on whether the parties 
involved qualify under the statute.ll 1 
1. Preplanned Adoption Act 
Under Florida Statutes Annotated section 63.213, the Preplanned 
Adoption Statute, anyone, regardless of their marital status, is eligible 
to enter into a surrogacy agreement as long as the agreement 
comports with the procedure set out in the statute.112 This provision 
can be used in either a traditional surrogacy arrangement or a 
gestational surrogacy arrangement, as there is no requirement 
delineating where the gametes originate in relation to the parties.1 13 
The Preplanned Adoption Statute provides a forty-eight hour window 
after the birth of the child for the woman who gave birth to change 
107. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (stating that 
the Equal Protection Clause requires that those who are similarly situated be treated 
equally). 
108. FLA. STAT. ANN.§§ 742.13-15 (West 2010); § 63.213 (West Supp. 2013). 
109. §§ 742.13-15; § 63.213. 
110. See, e.g., Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction 
and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 643 (2002). 
"Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire and Virginia's statutes all contain provisions 
requiring at least one of the intending parents to be a genetic parent of the child. In 
addition, these statutes require that the intending parents be married to each other." !d. 
The article goes on to briefly discuss the traditional surrogacy statute, but does not 
explain that the traditional model can be used by unmarried intended parents. !d. at 
643-47; see also Joseph F. Morrissey, Lochner, Lawrence, and Liberty, 27 GA. ST. U. 
L. REv. 609, 629 (2011) ("[S]ome of the states which expressly permit surrogacy, 
including Florida ... have closed off this avenue to unmarried people."). 
Ill. §§ 742.13-15 (West 2010); 63.213 (West Supp. 2013). 
112. § 63.213. 
113. !d. 
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her mind and keep the child. 114 As of July 1, 2012, this provision 
only applies when the gestational carrier is genetically related to the 
child. 115 
In addition, the statute requires court approval of the "adoption" of 
the child, using the standards outlined in the Florida adoption 
statutes. 116 Until recently, this connection to the Florida adoption 
statutes meant those in a same-sex relationship were implicitly 
prohibited from meeting the qualifications since Florida did not allow 
practicing homosexuals to adopt. 117 However, recently the ban on 
homosexual adoption has been changed, and sexual orientation is no 
longer a consideration in the adoption decision. 118 This change 
eliminates the last restriction based on marital status or sexual 
orientation. 119 
Finally, this statute allows for any party to change his or her mind 
throughout the entire term of the contract.120 The result of the 
application of this statute for many years was that the surrogate could 
keep the child and be considered the legal mother, even if she had no 
genetic link to the child. 121 So when a couple, married or not, used 
this process and chose to use a gestational surrogate but provided an 
embryo created using both of their gametes, they risked the chance 
that the surrogate carrier would change her mind about relinquishing 
the child and would keep it, regardless of her lack of genetic 
connection and the couple's genetic contribution. 122 
114. ld. § 63.213(2)(a). 
115. ld. 
116. See id. § 63.213(2)(c), (d). 
117. Until the recent case of Fla. Dept. of Children & Families v. Adoption of XXG, 45 
So. 3d 79, 92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010), which found Florida Statute Annotated § 
63.042(3) unconstitutional, homosexuals were banned from adopting. 
118. See id. at 91-92. 
119. See§ 63.042(3) (West Supp. 2013), invalidated by Fla. Dept. of Children & Families, 
45 So. 3d 79. 
120. § 63.213(2)(i) ("[T]he agreement may be terminated at any time by any of the 
parties."). 
121. The Preplanned Adoption statute contains no requirement that the gestational mother 
provide the egg, so even though there is a separate statute that addresses only 
gestational surrogacy, parties could choose to use a contract that conforms to the 
Preplanned Adoption statute instead, thereby creating a situation where the intended 
parent or parents provided the gametes or embryo and the gestational mother chose to 
rescind the agreement and keep the resulting child. 
122. See§ 63.213(2)(a), (e) (West 2012), amended by FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.213(2)(a), (e) 
(West Supp. 2013). 
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Under the new provisions of the Preplanned Adoption Statute, 
effective July 1, 2012, those who choose to use their own egg123 will 
be treated differently than those who rely on the gestational carrier to 
provide the egg. This will eliminate the odd potential of the 
gestational carrier retaining her rights to a child who has no genetic 
connection to her but has a genetic connection to at least one if not 
both of the intended parents. Simultaneously, however, the revised 
legislation discriminates against anyone who is unable to provide an 
egg and chooses to use the carrier's egg. A couple, married or not, 
who chooses to use the gestational carrier's egg (traditional 
surrogacy) runs the risk that the carrier will opt to retain her rights to 
the child. 124 The same distinction between "traditional surrogacy" 
and "gestational surrogacy" applies to all who use the provisions 
outlined by this statute. Consequently, in isolation, the statute 
appears to treat all equally. While this change seems appropriate 
since it treats all parties alike, the existence of an alternative that 
avoids this result, available only to married couples, highlights the 
way married and unmarried couples are treated differently. 125 
Looking more broadly at all of the options for surrogate 
arrangements available in Florida demonstrates a clear discriminatory 
distinction. Only married heterosexual couples have the option of 
following the process described in the Gestational Surrogacy 
provisions of the Florida statutes. 126 Unmarried couples and 
individuals are limited to the Preplanned Adoption provisions, 
including the requirement to comply with adoption standards, and the 
option of either party to terminate the agreement prior to the birth of 
the child. 127 Married couples may choose to proceed under either the 
Preplanned Adoption.statute or the Gestational Surrogacy Act. 128 
2. Gestational Surrogacy Act 
At first glance, the existence of the Preplanned Adoption statute 
does not appear to treat people differently based on their marital 
status, and now that Florida adoption laws are no longer excluding 
homosexuals, it does not prohibit surrogacy based on sexual 
123. When a surrogate contributes none of the genetic material the process is referred to as 
gestational surrogacy. If the surrogate carrier also contributes the egg, the process is 
referred to as traditional surrogacy. See Helene S. Shapo, Assisted Reproduction and 
the Law: Disharmony on a Divisive Social Issue, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 465, 474 (2006). 
124. See§ 63.213(1)(a), (2)(a), (e) (West Supp. 2013). 
125. See discussion of Florida Surrogacy Act infra Part IV.A.2. 
126. § 742.15(1) (West 2010). 
127. § 63.213(2)(i) (West 2012). 
128. § 63.213 (West 2012); § 742.15(1) (West 2010). 
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orientation.129 In isolation, it does not discriminate as currently 
written. 130 However, the 2012 Legislature amended this statute. 131 
The amendments eliminate the ability of a surrogate carrier to opt to 
keep the resulting child if she is a true gestational surrogate. 132 
Though this improves the statute by eliminating such a drastic option, 
and makes clear that all intended parents can use a gestational 
surrogacy arrangement, it does not address the other differences that 
demonstrate bias toward those who are married. 133 The potential for 
differing treatment arises by virtue of the fact that the legislature has 
also enacted another statute that deals exclusively with gestational 
surrogacy. 134 Under Florida Statutes Annotated § 742.13 et seq., a 
surrogacy arrangement where at least one of the intended parents has 
contributed genetic material and the surrogate has no genetic 
connection to the resulting child (a scenario that can potentially arise 
under the Preplanned Adoption statutes as well) is subject to an 
expedited and non-adversarial process to affirm parental rights. 135 As 
long as the surrogate has no genetic connection to the resulting child, 
and at least one of the intended parents does have a genetic 
connection, the gestational carrier cannot have any parental rights. 136 
She must immediately relinquish her rights to the child upon its 
birth, 137 and the intended parents are able to obtain an expedited order 
from the court affirming their rights as parents and naming them on 
the birth certificate. 138 There is no need for a long process and no 
application of the adoption standards to the determination. 139 Instead 
of a waiting period when the birth mother can change her mind, as in 
the Florida adoption statutes140 or the Preplanned Adoption Statute, 141 
129. See supra text accompanying notes 120-23. 
130. See supra text accompanying note 115. 
13 1. See discussion supra Part IV .A.1. 
132. See§ 63.213(1)(a), (2)(a), (e) (West Supp. 2013). 
133. See§ 63.213(6)(h) (West Supp. 2013). 
134. See§ 742.13-18. 
135. See§742.16. 
136. See§ 742.15 (3)(c), (e). 
137. § 742.15(3)(c). 
138. § 742.16(1), (8). 
139. See § 63.213(2) (West Supp. 2013) (outlining Florida's statutory adoption 
requirements). 
140. See§ 63.082 (4)(a), (b) ("(a) [C]onsent to an adoption shall not be executed before the 
birth of the minor. (b) A consent to the adoption of a minor who is to be placed for 
adoption may be executed by the birth mother 48 hours after the minor's birth or the 
day the birth mother is notified in writing, ... that she is fit to be released from the 
licensed hospital or birth center, whichever is earlier."). 
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the gestational mother has no option to claim the child. 142 Rather 
than an approval process that might involve the type of searching 
inquiry that courts use when evaluating adoptive parents, 143 the 
Gestational Surrogacy Statute simply requires the court to determine 
whether the terms of the contract have been met and that one of the 
intended parents has a genetic connection to the child. 144 
While Florida provides an option for unmarried couples where 
some other states do not, the significantly higher risks associated with 
the only option available to non-married couples highlights the 
blatant discrimination against non-married individuals and couples in 
a way that the other states do not. 145 Yet the same type of 
discrimination is created by states that limit surrogacy arrangements 
to married couples. 146 Though non-married couples have the option 
141. See § 63.213(l)(b) (West 2012) (prohibiting arrangements from "[c]onstitut[ing] 
consent of a mother to place her child for adoption until 48 hours following birth"); § 
63.213(2)(e) (requiring an agreement contain the acknowledgment of the intended 
parents that "they may not receive custody or the parental rights under the agreement 
if the volunteer mother terminates the agreement or if the volunteer mother rescinds 
her consent to place her child for adoption within 48 hours after birth"). 
142. See§ 742.15(3)(c) (West 2010) (providing that except when neither of the intended 
parents is genetically connected to the child, "the gestational surrogate agrees to 
relinquish any parental rights upon the child's birth and to proceed with the judicial 
proceedings prescribed under section 742.16"). 
143. Florida statue provides: 
The preliminary home study must include, at a minimum: 
(a) An interview with the intended adoptive parents; 
(b) Records checks of the department's central abuse registry and 
criminal records correspondence checks under s. 39.0138 through 
the Department of Law Enforcement on the intended adoptive 
parents; 
(c) An assessment of the physical environment of the home; 
(d) A determination of the financial security of the intended 
adoptive parents; 
(e) Documentation of counseling and education of the intended 
adoptive parents on adoptive parenting; 
(f) Documentation that information on adoption and the adoption 
process has been provided to the intended adoptive parents; 
(g) Documentation that information on support services available 
in the community has been provided to the intended adoptive 
parents; and 
(h) A copy of each signed acknowledgment of receipt of 
disclosure required by s. 63.085. 
§ 63.092(3) (West 2012); see also § 63.125 (West 2012) (explaining requirements of 
final home study). 
144. § 742.16(6) (West 2010). 
145. See discussion infra Part IV.D.l. 
146. See Storrow, supra note 110, at 643. 
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of creating families through adoption or a female partner's use of 
donated sperm, additional legal steps for both parties to become legal 
parents are required, which also means that additional scrutiny by the 
courts is required. 147 But it also means that these states allow non-
married individuals and couples to build their families in non-
traditional manners. 148 So the discrimination arises because of the 
limitations on the types of non-traditional, family-building options 
available. 149 
B. Justification for Discrimination 
As noted in Part II, in the early 1990s, when surrogacy was just 
beginning to be legislatively regulated, the Uniform Status of 
Children of Assisted Conception Aceso provided a model for state 
legislatures to use as they considered legislation related to surrogacy. 
The express purpose of the Uniform Act was to define the legal status 
of children. 151 The act provided two options for states to address 
surrogacy. 152 One was a complete ban; the other established specific 
and rigorous requirements designed to "protect the 'rights, security 
and well-being' of affected children" and to "provide a child with 
two legal parents."153 The requirements suggested by the Uniform 
Act included the requirement that the intended parents be a male and 
female, and married to each other. 154 The requirement that intended 
parents be married had the potential to bring up questions about 
whether states could limit this reproductive option to only married 
couples, and by extension, whether there was a fundamental right to 
procreation outside of marriage. 155 Most of the argument for the 
constitutionality of the distinction was based on the state's interest in 
preserving the marital family, traditional family life, and "historical 
notions of morality."156 
As the legislation was implemented in various states, scholars 
discussed potential challenges to the constitutionality of the 
legislative distinction based on the Due Process and Equal Protection 
147. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982). 
148. See supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text. 
149. See supra notes 123-36 and accompanying text. 
150. See discussion supra Part II.C-D. 
151. Massie, supra note 77, at 489; see also discussion supra Part II.D. 
152. Massie, supra note 77, at 490. 
153. !d. at 490, 495. 
154. !d. at 490. 
155. See id. at 508. 
156. !d. at 509. 
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provlSlons of the Constitution. 157 When evaluating the potential 
legislation under the Due Process Clause, the statute need only meet 
the rational basis test, since there are no status distinctions that trigger 
a higher standard of review. 158 Proponents of restricting the access to 
surrogacy arrangements to married couples argue that the state's 
interest in providing a child with a family that "include[ s] two 
parents, a man and a woman, who are married to each other"159 serves 
the best interests of the child and meets the rational basis test. 160 In 
fact, at the time the Uniform Act was being drafted, proponents 
argued that this reason would also meet the heightened scrutiny test, 
since serving the best interests of children rises to the level of a 
compelling state interest. 161 The argument continues by recognizing 
that requiring a heterosexual married couple at the time of the birth 
does not guarantee that the same family dynamic will remain as the 
child grows up. 162 Nor does it guarantee that the married couple 
requirement necessarily leads to a safe and supportive family 
environment; but the requirement that the child at least begin life in a 
situation like this was considered, by at least some, to be justification 
for the restriction to heterosexual married couples. 163 
This same reason, that a heterosexual married couple as a parental 
unit serves the best interest of the resulting child, is used to support 
the argument that the Equal Protection Clause is not violated by this 
statutory scheme. 164 This argument requires determining whether 
married couples and unmarried couples who want to use surrogacy 
are similarly situated. 165 The obvious difference is that one couple is 
legally recognized as a unit and the other is not, but this is not a 
legitimate reason to distinguish between married or unmarried 
couples who want to build families. 166 Under the current statutory 
system in Florida, it is difficult to suggest that married and unmarried 
couples, or even single individuals, are situated differently in terms of 
abilities to create families. 167 All can adopt. 168 All can use various 
157. See, e.g., id. at 499. 
158. !d. at 51 0; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 621 (1996). 
159. Massie, supra note 77, at 510-11. 
160. Jd. 
161. See id. at 511. 
162. Jd.atSll-12. 
163. See id. 
164. Seeid.at517. 
165. ld. at 515. 
166. Seeid.at517. 
167. See FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 63.213 (West 2012); § 742.15 (West 2010). 
168. See§ 63.213 (West 2012). 
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assisted reproductive technologies like sperm-donation and IVF .169 
All can enter into surrogate carrier arrangements. 17° Consequently, in 
terms of building families, couples, married or not, and individuals 
are similarly situated. 171 
C. Equal Protection Analysis 
Evaluating whether legislation violates the Equal Protection Clause 
requires initially determining the level of scrutiny to apply. 172 Laws 
affecting fundamental rights or targeting suspect classes, such as 
groups identified by race, gender, or alienage, are entitled to 
heightened scrutiny. 173 All other distinctions are evaluated using 
rational basis review. 174 
Though the right to procreate is a fundamental right, 175 it is unclear 
whether that right extends to the use of alternative reproductive 
technologies and the involvement of third parties.176 Until the use of 
alternative forms of procreation is specifically included within the 
fundamental right to procreate, it is more appropriate to consider that 
such use does not trigger the heightened scrutiny based on its 
potential as a fundamental right. 177 In this instance, it does not 
matter. Even under a rational basis review the statutory scheme is 
unconstitutional. 
Rational basis review asks whether a "legislative classification ... 
bears a rational relation to some legitimate end."178 Though the 
rational basis review is extremely deferential, there must be some 
relationship between the "classification adopted and the object to be 
attained."179 Generally, legislation does not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause if it "advance[ s] a legitimate government interest, 
even if the law seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of a 
particular group, or of the rationale for it seems tenuous."180 
169. See§ 742.14 (West 2010). 
170. See§742.15. 
171. See Massie, supra note 77, at 517. 
172. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,470 (1985). 
173. /d. at 440. 
174. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993). 
175. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rei. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
176. See Massie, supra note 77, at 516. 
177. See id. at 526. 
178. Romerv. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,631 (1996). 
179. /d. at 632. 
180. /d. 
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Most legislation survives rational basis scrutiny. 181 Even 
legislation that creates incidental disadvantages is constitutional if it 
also has legitimate public policy reasons supporting it. 182 But 
enactments that carve out a specific class of citizens and provide that 
class with a disfavored legal status "raise the inevitable inference that 
the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of 
persons affected."183 For instance, in Romer v. Evans184 Amendment 
2, the effort to remove legal protections regarding discriminatory 
practices from a single class of citizens-homosexuals-lacked any 
rational relationship to a state interest and was therefore invalid.185 In 
another example, Proposition 8 in California was also found to have 
violated the Equal Protection Clause by removing the ability of gays 
and lesbians to obtain marriages and to refer to the committed 
partnership that had all of the rights and obligations of traditional 
marriage as a "marriage."186 Unlike Amendment 2 in Romer, which 
was broad and affected many different situations, Proposition 8 
affected one specific right, "the right to use the designation of 
'marriage' to describe a couple's officially recognized 
relationship."187 Despite the precise nature of the disability imposed 
on the group by Proposition 8, it still worked a "meaningful harm" 
that "must be justified by some legitimate state interest."188 In fact, 
the Perry court found the precise nature of the harm made the 
legislation even more troublesome. 189 Both Amendment 2 and 
Proposition 8 required the reviewing courts to consider whether a 
legitimate state interest existed, and if not, to "infer that [the 
enactments were] enacted with only the constitutionally illegitimate 
basis of 'animus toward the class it affects. "'190 
181. Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 
1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REv. 357, 357 (1999) ("These cases 
are sufficiently rare to stand out as unusual, but they do exist. [From 1971 to 1996], 
the Court ... decided ten such cases, while during the same time period, it ha[d] 
rejected rational basis arguments on one hundred occasions."). 
182. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635. 
183. !d. at 634. 
184. !d. 
185. !d. at 635. 
186. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1095 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded by 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.Ct 2652 (2013). 
187. Id. at 1081. 
188. Id 
189. !d. 
190. Id. at 1082 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996)). 
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D. Justifications Break Down as Societal Values Shift 
The desire to protect the best interest of the resulting children, by 
providing them with parents who are male and female and married to 
each other, may have been legitimate as new ways of family building 
first started to appear in the early 1990s. 191 Without the experience of 
observing alternative family structures over a significant period of 
time, there was not enough evidence to support the assertion that 
these alternative forms of family structures were not harmful to 
children, and could also be in the best interest of the resulting child.192 
Though this distinction may have made sense at one point in our 
history, as family-building alternatives such as adoption, sperm 
donation to singles, and gay and lesbian parents raising children of 
their own or their partners became more common, and traditional 
surrogacy arrangements became available to unmarried individuals, 
the argument that children's interests were harmed by the lack of two 
heterosexual married parents became more difficult to support. 193 
Since there is no protected class or fundamental right involved, the 
legislature can regulate the different forms of family building 
differently as long as the regulation is reasonable in light of the 
legislative purpose.194 On its face, the statute that restricts the use of 
surrogacy arrangements to married couples only was a reasonable 
way to protect the best interests of the resulting children-at least as 
those interests were viewed at the time of the institution of these 
statutes-but that is no longer the case. 195 
191. See generally Gregory Acs & Sandi Nelson, CHANGES IN FAMILY STRUCTURE AND 
CHILD WELL-BEING: EVIDENCE FROM THE 2002 NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICA'S 
FAMILIES 1, 4 (2003), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/ 
311025_family_ structure.p.df (presenting an analysis of changing family structures 
including findings that cohabitation, a growing familial structure in the 1990s, is not 
as beneficial to children as is a marital home). 
192. See Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 822 (11th 
Cir. 2004) (explaining that the legislature could rationally conclude that a significant 
difference exists between heterosexual and homosexual households); In re Opinion of 
the Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 25 (N.H. 1987) ("Although opponents of the bill have cited 
a number of studies that find no correlation between a homosexual orientation of 
parents and the sexual orientation of their children, the source of sexual orientation is 
still inadequately understood and is thought to be a combination of genetic and 
environmental influences."). 
193. In fact, some previous gay marriage opponents have since changed their opinion 
based upon children's interests. See Mark Oppenheimer, In Shift, Activist Enlists 
Same-Sex Couples in a Pro-Marriage Coalition, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,2013, at Al9. 
194. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631. 
19 5. See discussion infra Part IV .D .1. 
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1. Marriage and the Best Interests of the Children 
Much of the argument about the best interests of the children is 
based on public policy that emphasized traditional, heterosexual 
marriages as the optimum situation for raising children. 196 In the 
early 1990s, some states still prohibited cohabitation, 197 and no state 
provided those who cohabited with the same legal protections that 
were available to married couples.198 This lack of legal recognition 
suggested that children of unmarried couples were more at risk of 
losing the support of one parent because the cohabiting couple was 
more likely to separate and the legal rights between the couple were 
too tenuous to provide the child with the same type of support that a 
child of divorced parents received. 199 The rationale for the distinction 
appears to be the imposition of a moral duty-an individual moral 
obligation to be married in order to create a family, because the act of 
creating a family has an effect on others, namely the resulting 
members of the family.200 Alternatively, this distinction between 
married and unmarried parents could be supported by the idea that 
legislation should reflect society's general moral values, and society 
(at least in part) valued marriage as the mechanism for building 
families. 201 At the time, the distinction may have been appropriate. 
If the legislative purpose for restricting surrogacy to married couples 
was to serve the best interests of the resulting children because the 
state provided more support to married couples, the two groups were 
196. See discussion supra Part N.B. 
197. For example, in 1990, Florida Statute section 798.02 addressed "[l]ewd[] and 
lascivious behavior," stating: "If any man and woman, not being married to each 
other, lewdly and lasciviously associate and cohabit together, or if any man or woman, 
married or unmarried, engages in open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior, 
they shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree .... " FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 
798.02 (West 2010). In the same year, Idaho had similar language in section18-6604: 
"Lewd cohabitation.-lf any man and woman, not being married to each other, shall 
live and cohabit together as man and wife, or shall lewdly and notoriously associate 
together, such man or woman is guilty of a misdemeanor." IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-
6604 (1986) (repealed 1994). Georgia criminalized the same behavior, but defmed it 
as fornication: "Fornication. An unmarried person commits the offense offomication 
when he voluntarily has sexual intercourse with another person and, upon conviction 
thereof, shall be punished as for a misdemeanor." GA. CODE ANN.§ 16-6-18 (2011), 
invalidated by In re J.M., 575 S.E.2d 441, 444 (Ga. 2003). 
198. See Massie, supra note 77, at 527. It was not until the advent of civil unions that 
states began to extend protections and benefits of marriage to couples who were 
unmarried. 
199. See id. 
200. !d. at 509. 
201. See Oppenheimer, supra note 193. 
2013] Legislative Oppression 639 
not similarly situated for the purpose of Equal Protection analysis.202 
Though this may have been a reasonable conclusion in the early 
1990s, when much of this legislation was being enacted, it no longer 
holds true today. 
Today the only distinction between married and unmarried couples 
involves a different process and differing levels of risk, so the 
argument that restricting this family-building option to only married 
couples to serve the best interests of the resulting child fails 
completely.203 When a married couple can engage a gestational 
surrogate who will never have any rights to the resulting child and 
will have to immediately turn the child over to the intended parents 
with no opportunity to make a choice to keep the child,204 yet an 
unmarried couple can only engage the services of a surrogate if they 
are willing to take the chance that the surrogate will change her mind 
and keep the child/05 or that the court will determine, through a much 
more rigorous review of the couple's qualifications to be parents, that 
they are unsuitable/06 the two similarly situated couples are treated 
differently. This different treatment appears to be based only on 
ideas about morality related to individual choices about sexual 
interactions, a characteristic that is not reasonably related to a 
legitimate state interest. Both couples are trying to build a family by 
using a surrogate. Both are allowed to do so under the statutory 
scheme. Yet the unmarried couple must assume more risk that the 
surrogate will be allowed to keep the child and the couple will be 
subjected to a much more rigorous and invasive review of their home 
situation before being allowed to proceed. 207 The argument that 
preventing unmarried couples from having children through 
surrogacy because of the best interests of the children cannot exist if 
the unmarried couple actually can engage the services of a surrogate, 
just with additional process and risk.208 
2. Genetic Connections 
One additional reason for the distinction might be the desire to 
maintain some type of genetic connection between the parent or 
parents and the resulting child, or to at least give that connection 
202. See discussion supra Part IV.C. 
203. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
204. See FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 742.15(2)(c) (West 2010). 
205. See§ 63.213(1)(b) (West2012). 
206. See§ 63.213(1)(a), (b). 
207. See§ 63.213(2)(c). 
208. See§ 63.213; §§ 742.13(2), 742.15. 
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some consideration, especially if one of the genetic contributors 
would not be involved in the upbringing of the child.209 The original 
pre-planned adoption legislation210 was drafted when the only option 
being considered was traditional surrogacy, so the best interest of the 
child involved looking at two genetic parents who were never going 
to be in the same household.211 Today, gestational surrogacy 
arrangements are the preferred model, meaning the gestational 
mother has no genetic connection to the resulting child, and the 
intended parents may or may not have a genetic connection.212 
Therefore, the best-interest analysis must consider more than just 
who the biological parents are, and instead look at who is most 
appropriate to be named the legal parents. 
When legislators, courts, and other policy makers consider how to 
handle parentage determinations and availability of surrogacy 
arrangements, they appear to put a good deal of emphasis on genetic 
consanguinity.213 For instance, despite the fact that it is medically 
possible to provide an embryo using a donor egg and donor sperm, or 
to use the donated embryo of a couple who did not intend to be 
donors until after the embryos were created, most surrogacy 
regulation requires at least one of the intended parents be genetically 
related to the resulting child. 214 Though potentially arising from a 
concern that no one would want to claim the child once it was born, 
leaving it in the custody of the state, this emphasis on genetic 
consanguinity is not present in other parentage determinations.215 
Family building that occurs through adoption completely ignores 
any requirement for genetic connections. 216 In fact, for a long time it 
209. See Hofman, supra note 1, at 451-53,460. 
210. § 63.213. 
211. See id. 
212. See Spivack, supra note 24, at 98-99. 
213. Compare Hofman, supra note 1, at 451-53, 460 (theorizing that genetic relation 
underlies many courts' approaches), with Spivack, supra note 25, at 97, 99, 101-06 
(discussing other approaches, including contractual and intent-based theories, to 
resolving legal disputes about parentage). 
214. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 168-B:l (XII) (2010). 
215. See Linda S. Anderson, Adding Players to the Game: Parentage Determinations when 
Assisted Reproductive Technology is Used to Create Families, 62 ARK. L. REv. 29, 
34-38 (2009); Linda S. Anderson, Just Because You Don't Want Kids Doesn't Mean I 
Can't Have Them: How Clarifying Definitions of "Parent" and "Procreate" Can 
Prevent the Indefinite Storage of Cryopreserved Embryos, 49 U. LOUISVILLE L. REv. 
231, 240-41 (2010). 
216. See 2 AM. JUR. 2D Adoption § 1 (2004) (suggesting that although states' methods of 
defining adoption vary, there is agreement about its general characteristics). 
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was impossible to adopt your own child,217 because adoption 
contemplates creating a family where no genetic connections 
existed.218 Even traditional family building with a heterosexual 
married couple puts little emphasis on genetic connections.Z19 A 
child born to a married couple is presumed to be the child of the 
husband and wife, even if there is not a genetic connection to one 
parent or the other. 220 
Despite this lack of emphasis on genetics in other options, the 
distinction present in the two contrasting Florida surrogacy schemes 
is at least somewhat based on where the genetic connections exist and 
where they are absent.221 The gestational surrogacy statute requires 
genetic connections with at least one parent,222 while the preplanned 
adoption statute does not include this requirement.223 Married 
couples can more easily build a family with no genetic connection to 
one or the other of them than unmarried couples.224 Unmarried 
couples and single individuals are left with a regulatory scheme that 
allows for the gestational mother to have no connection to the 
resulting child, but runs the risk that the gestational mother will opt to 
keep the child,225 whereas married couples have options that ignore 
any genetic ties to the surrogate and prohibit the possibility that the 
gestational mother will keep the child.226 
In order to meet constitutional muster, there must be a rational 
basis for the distinction between married and unmarried potential 
217. As same-sex couples began to find creative ways to build families, some individuals 
would have a child, relinquish their right to the child, and then try to adopt the same 
child as a couple. This was generally not allowed, so states began allowing second-
parent adoptions, even though there was still a parent who had not relinquished rights 
to the child. See generally In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002); 
Patricia J. Falk, Second-Parent Adoption, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 93 (2000); Ann K. 
Wooster, Annotation, Adoption of Child by Same-Sex Partners, 6! A.L.R. 6th I 
(2011). 
218. BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009), adoption. 
219. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 117, 119-20 (1989) (explaining the 
history and rationale behind California's statutory presumption that a child born to a 
married woman living with her husband is a child of that marriage). 
220. See id. at 128-29; Linda S. Anderson, Protecting Parent-Child Relationships: 
Determining Parental Rights of Same-Sex Parents Consistently Despite Varying 
Recognition of Their Relationship, 5 PIERCE L. REV. I, 7-8 (2006). 
221. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.213 (West 2012); §§ 742.13(2), 742.15 (West 2010). 
222. § 742.13(2)(West 2010). 
223. § 63.213 (West Supp. 2013). 
224. See Zuckerman, supra note 91, at 676-77. 
225. See§ 63.213(2)(e) (West Supp. 2013). 
226. § 742.15(3)(c). 
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parents.227 The best interests of the children is not a valid reason 
because unmarried couples can use the more invasive statute to create 
a family. 228 Genetic consanguinity is not a valid reason because the 
two statutes provide alternatives that allow situations with no genetic 
connection to the resulting children.229 The only rationale left is to 
enforce societal views about morality--especially moral judgments 
about the appropriateness of marriage for families, as opposed to 
alternative family situations.230 This reason alone is not enough to 
make the regulation constitutional.231 
V. MORALITY AS THE ONLY REMAINING RATIONALE 
If the state's rationale for distinguishing between married couples 
and unmarried couples cannot be based on the best interests of the 
resulting children, or the need for genetic consanguinity, then the 
only other reason that might account for the difference in treatment is 
to maintain "traditional family life"232 or to protect "historical notions 
of morality."233 Though at one time courts appeared to accept 
morals-based justifications for decisions, these decisions were never 
based exclusively on such justifications. Legislating based on 
morality alone is inappropriate because there is no way to identify 
whose morals are correct. 
A. Legislation and Morality 
The connection between societal views of morality and the law has 
long been assumed. 234 Yet these two concepts, while similar because 
227. Massie, supra note 77, at 510. 
228. § 63.213 (West Supp. 2013). 
229. Compare§ 742.15(3)(e) (West 2010) (providing that the surrogate assumes parental 
rights and responsibilities for the child if it is determined that neither member of the 
commissioning couple is the genetic parent of the child), with § 63.213(6)(d)-(e) 
(West Supp. 2013) (implying that a genetic relation between the child and either of 
the intended parents is not required). 
230. Zuckerman, supra note 91, at 681. 
231. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003) ("Indeed, we have never held that 
moral disapproval, without any other asserted state interest, is a sufficient rationale 
under the Equal Protection Clause to justify a law that discriminates among groups of 
persons."). 
232. Massie, supra note 77, at 509. 
233. /d. 
234. KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 161 (1987) (describing 
natural law as "the longstanding position in moral and legal theory that human law is 
in some sense derived from moral norms that are universally valid and discoverable· 
by reasoning about human nature or true human goods"); William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479, 1487 (1987) (arguing that 
courts interpret statutes in light of existing social norms rather than societal norms 
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they each seek to guide behavior, are not identical. 235 In fact, law is a 
subset, or at least partially a subset, of morality.236 Though law 
reflects society's views of morality, not all decisions related to 
appropriate moral behavior or enforcement of morality are 
appropriate to be incorporated into the law.237 Most scholars 
distinguish between enforcement of public morals and enforcement 
of private morals, suggesting that public morals involve actions that 
have a negative effect on others, whereas private morals are those 
that involve actions that are individual in nature, often related to 
sexual behavior.238 
In his series of lectures at Stanford University, noted legal 
philosopher H.L.A. Hart distinguished between morality that protects 
against harm to others and sexual morality, stating that "society could 
not exist without a morality which mirrored and supplemented the 
law's proscriptions of conduct injurious to others. But there is ... no 
evidence to support, and much to refute, the theory that those who 
existing at the time of enactment); Stanley Mosk, The Common Law and the Judicial 
Decision-Making Process, II HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 35, 36 (1988) (describing the 
evolution of the common law and its ability to reflect societal changes). This 
assumption is evident by the assertion of connections between morality and law 
without the need for citation, even by Supreme Court Justice Scalia. See City of Erie 
v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 310 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring); Romer v. Evans, 517 
U.S. 620, 644-48 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 
U.S. 560, 580 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
235. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Law's Limited Domain Confronts Morality's 
Universal Empire, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1579, 1585-86 (2007). 
236. !d. at 1581 ("[L]egal incorporation of morality presents the odd case of the subset 
incorporating the larger set, and thus suggests the peculiar image of a mouse 
attempting to swallow a python."). 
237. See id.; Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before 
and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1300-04 (2004) (discussing the 
influence of morality on the law after Lawrence's disavowal of morality as a 
legitimate basis for legislation); Gregory Kalscheur, Moral Limits on Morals 
Legislation: Lessons for U.S. Constitutional Law from the Declaration on Religious 
Freedom, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. I, 30 (2006) (distinguishing public morality from 
private morality and suggesting that "public good," rather than morality in general, is 
the appropriate role of legislation). 
238. See, e.g., G. Marcus Cole, What Is the Government's Role in Promoting Morals? . .. 
Seriously?, 31 HARV. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 77, 79 (2008) (using the terms morality of 
aspiration and morality of duty, where morality of duty involves the "basic duty to 
respect the person and property of others"); Timothy W. Reinig, Comment, Sin, 
Stigma & Society: A Critique of Morality and Values in Democratic Law and Policy, 
38 BUFF. L. REV. 859, 880 (1990). 
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deviate from conventional sexual morality are in other ways hostile to 
society. "239 
Morality, encompassing both private and public, describes what 
one ought to do, and is grounded in religious teachings?40 Even 
within the concept of morality, it is possible to have conflicting views 
about what constitutes proper behavior.241 In fact, there is continuing 
debate and disagreement about what morality requires about all sorts 
of things, which provides the ultimate rationale for law and the legal 
system-to settle disputes about what morality requires in specific 
instances. 242 
However, the proper role of the government in promoting or 
enforcing morals is subject to much debate.243 There appears to be 
strong agreement that standards of morality concerning harm to 
others or others' property ar~ legitimate reasons for the government 
to get involved in enforcement through legislation.244 Laws relating 
to murder, assault, robbery, and trespass fall into this category.245 
The harder question is whether areas of morality that might be 
described as virtues are proper subjects for legislation.246 Until the 
time of King Henry VIII, who took control of the Church of England 
in the 16th century/47 morality related to virtues was the domain of 
the ecclesiastical courts.248 Today, in a system that imposes 
regulations on individuals with vastly different belief systems, 
continuing to use legislation to impose certain moral imperatives may 
impinge on others' freedom to hold alternative beliefs about 
morality. 249 
While regulating public morality may still be appropriate because 
doing so protects people from harm created by the choices of others 
and respects basic human dignity, regulating private morality-what 
we each choose to do in private, whether virtuous or not-becomes 
239. H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 50-51 (1963). 
240. Cole, supra note 238, at 78. 
241. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 236, at 1583. 
242. /d. at 1583-84. 
243. Cole, supra note 238, at 77. 
244. /d. at 79. 
245. /d. at 77, 79. 
246. /d. at 79. 
247. King Henry VII ruled England from 1509 to 1547. During the 1530s and 1540s he 
expanded royal authority at the expense of ecclesiastical authority. See A.F. 
POLLARD, Biography of King Henry VIII of England, in 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA, 289 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1910), available at http:// 
www.luminarium.org/renlit/tudorbio.htm. 
248. Cole, supra note 238, at 81. 
249. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 232-33. 
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significantly more complicated in a world where we are expected to 
respect everyone's right to practice their own religion and where 
tolerance of those who are different from us is expected in all realms 
oflife.250 
B. Public Morality vs. Private Morality 
Some restrictions on private morality are appropriate because the 
behaviors being restricted can lead to potentially harmful effects on 
others?51 Legislation that is designed to protect public morals 
includes such things as restrictions on gambling/52 the attempt to 
prohibit the use of alcohol/53 and the outlawing of prostitution.254 
Each of these attempts to regulate individual behavior has a basis in 
both private and public morals.255 The restrictions on individual 
behavior are likely to discourage behavior that is commonly 
250. See generally GREENAWALT, supra note 234, at 26 (asserting that "reasons relating 
exclusively to one's own welfare do not establish what, morally, one ought to do; 
people are free morally not to pursue their own welfare"). 
251. See HART, supra note 239, at 50-51. 
252. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE§ 330 (West 2012). In fact, Title 9 of the California Penal 
Code is titled specifically, "Of Crimes Against the Person Involving Sexual Assault, 
and Crimes Against Public Decency and Good Morals," and addresses things such as 
sexual offenses crimes against children, spousal abuse, obscenity, and gambling. See 
also KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 528.010 (West 2006). The commentary to the Kentucky 
statutes restricting gambling state: 
The principal concept of the entire gambling chapter is to punish 
those who make a business or profession of gambling rather than 
the player who makes the business possible. Subsection (1), 
advancing gambling, and subsection (8), profiting from gambling, 
define the basic proscribed gambling activities. "Advancing 
gambling activity" refers to the activities of the operator of a 
gambling enterprise as well as the person who sets up a game, 
furnishes equipment, provides facilities for gambling or entices 
others to patronize gambling activities. A "player" as defined in 
subsection (7), does not advance gambling activity. "Profiting 
from gambling activity" is intended to reach the entrepreneurs 
who receive money or other profit, other than as a player, 
pursuant to an understanding or agreement to that effect. 
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 528.010 Kentucky Crime Commission/LRC Commentary 
1974 (West 2006). 
253. See, e.g., U.S. CONST., amend. XVIII (in effect from Jan. 16, 1919, until ratification of 
the 21st Amendment in 1933). 
254. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 53a-82 (West 2012); D.C. CODE§ 22-2701 (Supp. 
2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 796.07 (West Supp. 2013); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
207.030 (LexisNexis 2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1029 (West 2012); TENN. 
CODE ANN.§ 39-13-512 (Supp. 2012). 
255. See, e.g., Ballock v. State, 73 Md. 1, 7-8, 20 A. 184, 186 (1890). 
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considered lacking in virtue, but more importantly, the restrictions 
protect others who may be harmed by this lack of virtuous 
behavior.256 Legislation to restrict gambling has been justified by the 
need to protect families from the financial trouble that often 
accompanies excessive gambling.257 Prohibition was designed to 
discourage and eliminate the potentially harmful behavior that can 
occur when one is intoxicated.258 Banning prostitution protects those 
who would participate from various sexually transmitted diseases, as 
well as protects women from being exploited.259 
1. Morality as a Legitimate Basis for Legislation 
In addition, our legal system has considered morality a potentially 
legitimate reason for legislation in a number of areas of society where 
it is challenging to determine whether the moral imperative is 
personal or public. 260 In each of these instances, where courts 
reviewed regulation based at least in part on morality, the legislation 
was allowed when it was based on a combination of both public 
morality and private morality.261 Susan Goldberg has classified 
instances where the court has considered issues with overtones, 
whether implicit or explicit, of morality-based legislation, into four 
categories: "pure, composite, embedded, and inert."262 Pure morality 
rationales involve no other possible reason for the legislation, which 
256. Cf Raymond Ku, Swingers: Morality Legislation and the Limits of State Police 
Power, 12 Sr. THOMAS L. REv. 1, 34 (1999) (discussing restriction of harm to others 
as basis for morality-based legislation in state police power context). 
257. See generally Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 177 
(1999) (acknowledging that in the past, commercial speech surrounding lotteries was 
not protected by the First Amendment because the "demoralizing influence upon the 
people" was a legitimate reason to restrict advertising about lotteries). This same case 
identifies the governments concerns about gambling as "contribut[ing] to corruption 
and organized crime; underwrit[ing] bribery, narcotics trafficking, and other illegal 
conduct; impos[ing] a regressive tax on the poor; and 'offer[ing] a false but 
sometimes irresistible hope of financial advancement."' /d. at 185 (quoting Brief of 
Respondent at 15-16, Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass 'n, 527 U.S. 173, 1999 WL 
161073, at *15-16). 
258. See generally Lisa Lucas, Comment, A New Approach to the Wine Wars: Reconciling 
the Twenty-First Amendment with the Commerce Clause, 52 UCLA L. REv. 899, 915 
(2005) (discussing movement to curb prevalence of alcohol). 
259. See generally Sylvia A. Law, Commercial Sex: Beyond Decriminalization, 73 S. CAL. 
L. REv. 523, 545 (2000) (discussing public health concerns for criminalization of 
commercial sex). 
260. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195-96 (1986), overruled by Lawrence 
v. Texas, 593 U.S. 558 (2003). 
261. See Goldberg, supra note 237, at 1235-36. 
262. !d. at 1244. 
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is rare.263 Pure morality rationales were successful (for a time) in 
Bowers v. Hardwick/64 and were attempted but unsuccessful in 
Lawrence v. Texas. 265 In these two cases, the only reasons provided 
for legislatively restricting behavior that had no effect beyond the 
individuals involved was concern about the virtuousness of that 
behavior.266 In other cases, morals rationales have been combined 
with interests related to obvious means of reducing harm or 
increasing benefits.267 Goldberg names this combination of morality 
with other reasons composite morals-based justifications.268 Other 
cases imply a basis in morality, yet never actually discuss the moral 
263. See id. at 1244-45. 
264. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 593 U.S. 558 (2003)). 
!d. 
Even if the conduct at issue here is not a fundamental right, 
respondent asserts that there must be a rational basis for the law 
and that there is none in this case other than the presumed belief 
of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy 
is immoral and unacceptable. This is said to be an inadequate 
rationale to support the law. The law, however, is constantly 
based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing 
essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due 
Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed. Even 
respondent makes no such claim, but insists that majority 
sentiments about the morality of homosexuality should be 
declared inadequate. We do not agree, and are unpersuaded that 
the sodomy laws of some 25 States should be invalidated on this 
basis. 
265. Lawrence, 593 U.S. at 582-83. 
This case raises a different issue than Bowers: whether, under the 
Equal Protection Clause, moral disapproval is a legitimate state 
interest to justify by itself a statute that bans homosexual sodomy, 
but not heterosexual sodomy. It is not. Moral disapproval of this 
group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is 
insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal 
Protection Clause. Indeed, we have never held that moral 
disapproval, without any other asserted state interest, is a 
sufficient rationale under the Equal Protection Clause to justify a 
law that discriminates among groups of persons. 
Moral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate 
governmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause because 
legal classifications must not be "drawn for the purpose of 
disadvantaging the group burdened by the law." 
!d. (internal citations omitted). 
266. Goldberg, supra note 237, at 1244. 
267. !d. at 1245. 
268. Id. 
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implications.269 These are referred to as using "embedded morals 
rationale.'mo Finally, cases that use the inert morals rationale rely on 
other reasons for the actual decision, but explicitly discuss the moral 
implications. 271 
2. Morality Alone Is Insufficient 
Though many cases have mentioned morals as part of the rationale, 
morality alone, or pure morality, has almost never been sufficient to 
allow regulation.272 Instead, the Supreme Court has increasingly 
emphasized "observable societal harms. "273 Vice alone, without 
damage to others, has not been the subject oflegitimate regulation. 274 
One of the reasons it is so difficult to· use morality to enforce 
virtue-those personal decisions that do not result in societal harm-
is that virtue and the associated benefits that spring from a virtuous 
life require the freedom to choose without coercion.275 Even the 
Catholic Church, one of the institutions from which moral 
responsibilities spring, recognizes that religious freedom requires that 
each person is treated with dignity, which is protected by the 
constitution that governs society, regardless of their choices about 
269. !d. at 1244 (identifying cases that restrict adult entertainment, obscenity, and foul 
language). 
270. !d. One example of"embedded morals rationale" that Goldberg cites is City of Erie v. 
Pap's A.M, 529 U.S. 277 (2000). Pap's A.M relied on the city's interest in 
combating the secondary effects of nude dancing to find the regulation content-neutral 
and therefore subject to the standard applied to restrictions on symbolic speech rather 
than the higher standard applied to content-based restrictions. Pap's A.M, 529 U.S. at 
295-96. The closest the Court came to mentioning morals as a rationale for the 
regulation appeared when Justice O'Connor stated that '"few of us would march our 
sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see' specified 
anatomical areas exhibited at establishments like [the nude dance club]." 529 U.S. at 
294 (quoting Justice Steven's opinion in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 
U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality opinion)). 
271. Goldberg, supra note 237, at 1246 (citing Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y. City, 438 
U.S. 104 (1978), as an example). In this case the Court mentioned that land-use 
regulations are generally upheld when '"the health, safety, morals, or general welfare' 
would be promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses of land" yet the 
decision rested on other reasons. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 125 (quoting 
Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928)). 
272. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 
U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he fact that the governing majority 
in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient 
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice .... ")). 
273. Goldberg, supra note 237, at 1259. 
274. See id. at 1260 (citing Professor Christopher Tiedeman's objection to the use of police 
power solely to "banish vice and sin from the world"). 
275. See Cole, supra note 238, at 84; Kalscheur, supra note 237, at 9. 
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morality.276 And the associated decision-making that is afforded to 
those who are entitled to exercise their own judgment requires that 
"no one is forced to act in a manner contrary to their own beliefs, ... 
no one is to be restrained from acting in accordance with their own 
beliefs" and that "the dignity of the human person in no way depends 
on whether or not the person's beliefs or actions are in accord with 
religious or moral truth."277 
Legislation that encourages virtuous behavior that will have a 
positive effect on others; that is, legislation that codifies a commonly 
accepted duty to others may also be considered regulation of public 
morality. For instance, statutes that establish compulsory education 
impose a duty on parents to insure that their children receive at least a 
minimal level of education. 278 Most would consider this a moral 
obligation as part of parenthood, yet all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia address compulsory education through legislation, and 
many include criminal penalties for failure to comply.279 The duty to 
276. See Kalscheur, supra note 237, at 8-9. 
277. /d. at 9. 
278. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 380.1561 (West Supp. 2012). 
/d. 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, for a child who 
turned age 11 before December 1, 2009 or who entered grade 6 
before 2009, the child's parent, guardian, or other person in this 
state having control and charge of the child shall send that child to 
a public school during the entire school year from the age of 6 to 
the child's sixteenth birthday. Except as otherwise provided in 
this section, for a child who turns age 11 on or after December 1, 
2009 or a child who was age 11 before that date and enters grade 
6 in 2009 or later, the child's parent, guardian, or other person in 
this state having control and charge of the child shall send the 
child to a public school during the entire school year from the age 
of 6 to the child's eighteenth birthday. 
279. See 50 State Statutory Surveys, Compulsory Education, 0040 SURVEYS 6 (Westlaw 
2007). A Colorado statue also imposes a legal obligation on parents in the following 
provision: 
The general assembly hereby declares that two of the most 
important factors in ensuring a child's educational development 
are parental involvement and parental responsibility. The general 
assembly further declares that it is the obligation of every parent 
to ensure that every child under such parent's care and supervision 
receives adequate education and training. Therefore, every parent 
of a child who has attained the age of six years on or before 
August 1 of each year and is under the age of seventeen years 
shall ensure that such child attends the public school in which 
such child is enrolled in compliance with this section. 
CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 22-33-104(5)(a) (West 2011). 
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provide children with an education has long been a part of American 
jurisprudence.280 In 1923, in Meyers v. Nebraska, the United States 
Supreme Court pointed out that 
[t]he American people have always regarded education and 
acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance 
which should be diligently promoted. The Ordinance of 
1787 declares: 'Religion, morality and knowledge being 
necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, 
schools and the means of education shall forever be 
encouraged.' Corresponding to the right of control, it is the 
natural duty of the parent to give his children education 
suitable to their station in life; and nearly all the states, 
including Nebraska, enforce this obligation by compulsory 
laws.281 
Other parental obligations are as commonly accepted and 
considered some sort of natural duty as well. Child support 
legislation codifies the duty of parents to provide financial support 
for their children, an obligation that is so widely held that federal 
statutes exist to enforce this obligation. 282 Yet these statutorily 
enforced duties may also be classified as morally imposed obligations 
on individual behavior.283 
C. Current Demographics 
Morality is generally considered to be based on commonly 
accepted ideals of appropriate human conduct. Yet the ideas 
regarding the appropriateness of allowing same-sex couples or single 
individuals to have children may have evolved to the point where 
there is no "commonly accepted ideal" regarding this behavior. In 
fact, according to the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services, the number of single women having children "increased ... 
to historic levels in 2007. "284 During that year, "about six in seven 
births to teenagers were non-marital. Sixty percent of births to 
280. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923). 
281. /d. (emphasis added). 
282. See, e.g., Child Support and Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2006) 
(establishing enforcement mechanism for collecting outstanding child support across 
state boundaries). 
283. See State Dep't of Revenue v. Hubbard, 720 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Mont. 1986) ("Child 
support is a social and moral obligation imposed by law without court action."). 
284. Joyce A. Martinet al., Births: Final Data for 2007, NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP. 24, Aug. 
9, 2010, at 1, 2. 
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women aged 20-24 years and almost one-third of births to women 
aged 25-29 years were to unmarried women."285 From 2002 to 
2007,286 increases in the number of non-marital births began to 
increase steeply, reaching an increase of 26 percent from 2002 to 
2007.287 
D. No Public Morality Reason Remaining 
In light of the changing demographics, it seems reasonable to 
suggest that social values relating to children and the need for a 
heterosexual, two-parent household are changing. 288 If the reasons 
for legislatively restricting unmarried and same-sex couples from 
using the same form of surrogacy agreements that are available to 
heterosexual married couples no longer involve public morality-the 
protection of the best interests of the children-then the only reason 
left to create this difference is private morality-imposing one 
individual's ideas about virtuous behavior on another, in areas that 
only affect the individuals involved.289 As demonstrated in Part 
V.B.2, using this type of morality-based justification is a not 
legitimate reason to enact legislation that discriminates against those 
who wish to build families using surrogacy but are not in a 
heterosexual marriage.290 
VI. PURE MORALS-BASED LEGISLATION EQUALS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ANIMUS 
When the only reason for legislation that isolates a particular group 
of people for different treatment is to impose a moral imperative, the 
legislation is likely to be expressing a level of animus that is also 
intolerable under the Equal Protection Clause.291 Pure morals-based 
legislation can demonstrate animosity toward a particular group and 
285. !d. at 8. 
286. 2011 is the most current data available from the National Center for Health Statistics. 
See id. at 1. 
287. !d. at 14; STEPHANIE J. VENTURA, CHANGING PATTERNS OF NONMARITAL 
CHILDBEARING IN THE UNITED STATES, NCHS DATA BRIEF 2 (May 2009). 
288. See generally Douglas B. Downey & Brian Powell, Do Children in Single-Parent 
Households Fare Better Living with Same-Sex Parents?, 55 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 55 
(1993); Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of 
Parents Matter?, 66 AM. Soc. REv. 159 (2001). 
289. See supra Part V.A-B. 
290. See supra Part V.B.2. 
291. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (striking down legislation that had "the 
peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single 
named group" as "an exceptional and ... invalid form of legislation"). 
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the moral choices that group generally makes.292 The 
unconstitutional animus toward homosexuals in Romer93 and Perr/94 
reflected voters' disagreement with a particular lifestyle. Much of 
this disagreement is based on the idea that homosexuality is 
immoral.295 Creating laws that work a "meaningful harm" based only 
on a justification that expresses animosity toward the moral choices 
of the individuals affected violates the Equal Protection Clause, and 
therefore cannot be tolerated.296 
The current legislatively created options for surrogacy 
arrangements in Florida, which allow both married and unmarried 
people to engage the services of a surrogate carrier, but create more 
risks, restrictions, and administrative burdens on those who are 
unmarried than those who are married, create a meaningful harm that 
can only be based on an illegitimate animosity toward the moral 
choices of those who are singled out for more restrictive treatment.297 
Similar to the laws in Romer and Perry, which were unconstitutional, 
the Florida statute that restricts gestational surrogacy contracts to 
married couples only is also unconstitutional. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For. many years courts assumed that legislatures had every right to 
enact legislation to protect the public morals. 298 Early cases that 
evaluated morality-based legislation focused on alcohol use, 
prostitution, and obscenity.299 The courts routinely found legislation 
reasonable when it furthered some interest and protected the public's 
view of a moral life.300 However, as society changed, so did the 
292. See id. at 634 (explaining that the morals-based legislation before the court in that 
case raises "the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of 
animosity toward the class of persons affected"). 
293. Romer, 517 U.S. 620; see discussion supra Part IV.C. 
294. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded by 
Hollingsworth v. Perry. 133 S.Ct 2652 (2013). 
295. See id. at 1095 (explaining the only possible reason for Proposition 8 was to express 
disapproval for personal choices). 
296. See id. 
297. See supra Part IV.A.1-2. 
298. See supra Part V.B. 
299. See supra Part V.B. 
300. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 588, 589 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Countless 
judicial decisions and legislative enactments have relied on the ancient proposition 
that a governing majority's belief that certain sexual behavior is 'immoral and 
unacceptable' constitutes a rational basis for regulation."). 
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courts' comfort level with accepting the regulation of public morality 
as a reason for restricting behavior.301 
Restricting access to surrogacy arrangements to only married, 
heterosexual couples is only an effort to hang on to the moral values 
of the past, despite the fact that the values of the present, and 
potentially the future, are much more tolerant of a variety of types of 
relationships and families. Societal values have shifted from 
oppressing those who choose different ways to build families, to 
being tolerant, and accepting a variety of family situations and 
valuing them all. It is time for the legislation to reflect this change 
and provide the same options for the use of surrogacy agreements to 
all individuals and couples, regardless of their marital status or sexual 
orientation. 
301. See id. at 578 (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)) (majority 
opinion). 
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